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Dellums v. Smith: Judicial Review Under
the Ethics in Government Act and
Neutrality Act Application to
Executive Actions
I.

INTRODUCTION

Observe good faith and justice toward all nations. Cultivate
peace and harmony with all.... The Nation which indulges toward
another an habitual hatred or an habitualfondness is in some degree a slave. It is a slave to its animosity or to its affection, either of
which is sufficient to lead it astrayfrom its duty and its interest.
'Tis our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances, with
any portion of the foreign world.-George Washington.1
The persistent fear that the United States would be drawn into a
disastrous European conflict led Congress, with the strong support of
President Washington, to enact the Neutrality Act of 1794.2 The
Neutrality Act prohibits private citizens from engaging in acts of ag3
gression toward nations with whom the United States is at peace.
4 it
Although in recent years the Neutrality Act had fallen into disuse,
became the basis for a spirited challenge to the Reagan Administration's covert war against Nicaragua. 5
In late 1983, following the Attorney General's refusal to investigate alleged violations of federal law within the White House, several
private citizens brought an action in federal court to compel an investigation under the Ethics in Government Act. 6 Although the district
court in Dellums v. Smith7 found that the Attorney General was compelled under the Ethics Act to conduct a preliminary investigation of
1. President George Washington's Farewell Address of September 17, 1796. See J.
BARTLETr, BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 379 (15th ed. 1980).
2. The 1794 Neutrality Act is presently codified in 18 U.S.C. § 960 (1982).
3. See Lobel, The Rise and Decline of the NeutralityAct. Sovereignty and Congressional
War Powers in United States Foreign Policy, 24 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 1 (1983).
4. Id. at 2.
5. Dellums v. Smith, 573 F. Supp. 1489 (N.D.Cal. 1983), motion to alterjudgment denied, 577 F. Supp. 1449 (N.D.Cal. 1984), motion to stay denied, 577 F. Supp. 1456 (N.D.Cal.
1984), rev'd, 797 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1986).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 591 (1982).
7. Dellums, 573 F. Supp. at 1496.
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the alleged wrongdoing,8 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding instead that the plaintiffs lacked standing to seek review of the Attorney General's actions. 9 Though the plaintiffs were
ultimately unsuccessful, Dellums foreshadowed the storm of controversy which later engulfed the Reagan presidency following public
disclosure and the subsequent congressional investigation of the
10
"Iran-Contra Affair."'
This note addresses the central issues raised in Dellums v. Smith;
whether a federal court can review the Attorney General's non-compliance with the mandatory preliminary investigation provision of the
Ethics in Government Act," and whether criminal prosecutions
under the Neutrality Act 12 may be brought against members of the
Executive branch who participate in covert paramilitary operations
against nations with whom the United States is at peace.
The analysis begins by reviewing the factual and procedural history of Dellums v. Smith, and proceeds with an analysis of the Dellums circuit court decision. The note points out the flaws in the
circuit court's reasoning which has resulted in the impairment of the
Ethics Act's effectiveness. To correct the damage, the note proposes
an amendment to the Act to facilitate judicial review. Finally, the
note analyzes the applicability of the Neutrality Act to executive actions, and concludes that government officials who participate in covert operations should be held criminally liable for such conduct.

II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In January of 1983, Congressman Ronald Dellums13 sent a letter
to Attorney General William French Smith' 4 alleging that seven
members of the Executive' 5 branch had violated federal law by their
8. Id.
9. Dellums v. Smith, 797 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1986).
10. The "Iran-Contra Affair" involved clandestine arms sales to Iran and the subsequent
transfer of proceeds to the anti-Sandinista rebels. See Comment, The Iran-ContraAffair, the
Neutrality Act, and the Statutory Definition of "At Peace", 27 VA. J. INT'L L. 343 (1987).

11. 28 U.S.C. § 591 (1982).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 960 (1982).
13. During the 100th Congress, Ronald Dellums represented California's 8th Congressional district in Oakland, California, and served as Chairman of the Armed Services Subcommittee on Military Construction.
14. William French Smith served as United States Attorney General under President
Ronald Reagan from 1981 through 1985.
15. The plaintiffs sought to compel the Attorney General to investigate alleged violations
of federal law committed by President Ronald Reagan, former Secretary of State Alexander
Haig, Secretary of State George Shultz, Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Enders, Secretary
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involvement in paramilitary operations against Nicaragua.16 Dellums
asked the Attorney General to conduct an investigation of the alleged
criminal activity.1 7 Two months later, Smith responded by denying
Dellums' request.1 8
Soon thereafter, Congressman Dellums, and two other private
citizens, Myrna Cunningham and Eleanor Ginsberg, brought a mandamus action in the federal district court to compel the Attorney
General' 9 to conduct an investigation under the Ethics in Government Act which provides in pertinent part: "[tihe Attorney General
shall conduct an investigation pursuant to the provisions of this chapter... whenever the Attorney General receives information sufficient
to constitute grounds to investigate [that a designated federal official]
has committed a violation of any Federal criminal law."'20 Although
violations of several criminal statutes 2 1 were asserted, the plaintiffs
relied upon alleged violations of the Neutrality Act, which provides:
Whoever, within the United States, knowingly begins or sets on
foot or provides or prepares a means for or furnishes the money
for, or takes part in, any military or naval expedition or enterprise
to be carried on from thence against the territory or dominion of
any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district, or people
with whom the United States is at peace, shall be fined not more
than $3,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both. 22
The plaintiffs claimed that the named Executive officials had violated the Neutrality Act by: (1) providing at least $19 million to finance covert paramilitary operations against Nicaragua; (2) financing
of Defense Caspar Weinberger, Assistant Secretary of Defense Nestor Sanchez, and Central
Intelligence Agency Director William Casey. Deilums v. Smith, 797 F.2d 817, 819 (9th Cir.
1986).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. The Attorney General stated, "[the material provided] does not constitute specific

information of a federal offense sufficient to constitute grounds to investigate." Dellums v.
Smith, 573 F. Supp. 1489, 1492 (N.D.Cal. 1983).
19. Defendants included William French Smith, individually and in his official capacity
as Attorney General of the United States, and D. Lowell Jensen, individually and in his official
capacity as Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division of the United States Department of
Justice. Dellums, 573 F. Supp. at 1489.
20. 28 U.S.C. § 591 (1982).
21. The letter alleged violations of the Neutrality Act 18 U.S.C. § 960 (1982) (prohibiting
involvement in military expeditions against countries with whom the United States is at peace),
18 U.S.C. § 956 (1982) (prohibiting involvement in a conspiracy to destroy the property of a
foreign government), and 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1982) (prohibiting unlicensed shipment of firearms). Dellums, 797 F.2d at 819.
22. 18 U.S.C. § 960 (1982).
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training of various anti-Nicaraguan groups in the United States for an
invasion of Nicaragua; (3) providing intelligence by the CIA to determine specific targets for the anti-Nicaraguan forces; (4) using Honduras as a base for the invasionary forces; (5) providing support to
Nicaraguan and Cuban exile organizations who train and support invasionary forces on United States soil; and (6) sending hundreds of
CIA officials, agents and other United States government agents to
Honduras and Costa Rica to participate and assist in covert military
operations against the people and government of Nicaragua. 23
A.

The District Court

The plaintiffs did not ask the district court to declare that the
President and his subordinates had violated the Neutrality Act, 24 because several previous courts had found that private citizens could not
challenge the legality of the Adminstration's policies in Central
America.2 5 Instead, the plaintiffs asked only that the Attorney General be compelled under the Ethics in Government Act to investigate
alleged violations of criminal law. 26 The plaintiffs filed a motion for
summary judgment and the defendants filed a cross-motion to dismiss
27
the complaint.
The defendants did not dispute that the information provided by
the plaintiffs was sufficiently specific nor did they question the plaintiffs' credibility. Rather, the defendants argued that the court could
not hear the case because: (1) the plaintiffs lacked standing to maintain the suit; (2) the case involved a "nonjusticiable political question"; and (3) the case was outside the competence of the court
because it called for an advisory opinion.28 In a decision by Senior
District Judge Stanley A. Weigel, the court resolved all three contentions in favor of the plaintiffs and ordered the Attorney General to
conduct a preliminary investigation of the alleged criminal activities
29
within the Executive branch.
The plaintiffs' assertion of standing rested on two propositions.
The plaintiffs claimed that they had presented sufficient information
23. Dellums, 573 F. Supp. at 1492.
24. Id. at 1493.
25. See Crockett v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1983); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1983).
26. Dellums, 573 F. Supp. at 1493.
27. Id. at 1492.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1505.
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to the Attorney General to require an investigation into whether there
had been criminal wrongdoing, and that the underlying criminal acts
of the Administration had directly injured them. Dellums claimed
that the Attorney General's refusal to conduct a preliminary investigation had deprived him of his constitutional right as a member of
Congress to vote on a declaration of war against Nicaragua.3 0 Myrna
Cunningham, a physician residing in Nicaragua, claimed that she was
kidnapped and raped by United States supported anti-Sandinista, Nicaraguan rebels.3 In addition, Eleanor Ginsberg, a resident of Florida, claimed that paramilitary training near her home constituted a
32
nuisance and disrupted her enjoyment of her property.
To resolve the question of standing, the district court applied a
three-part test articulated by the Supreme Court. 33 To establish
standing, the plaintiff must show: "(1) that he personally has suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal
conduct of the defendant; (2) that the injury fairly can be traced to the
challenged action; and (3) that the injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable decision."'3 4 Furthermore, when a plaintiff seeks review of
an agency action, the Supreme Court requires that the interest sought
to be protected by the plaintiff be "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guar35
antee in question."
The court began by finding that the underlying criminal acts asserted by the plaintiffs did not create a sufficient nexus between the
plaintiffs' status and the claim sought to be adjudicated to confer
standing.3 6 However, as to the plaintiffs' alternate standing argument,
the court found that the defendants' refusal to conduct an investigation denied the plaintiffs' right to "aid in ensuring that violations of
criminal law are not ignored because the persons accused are Administration officials." 37 According to the court, whether this alleged injury would implicate an interest cognizable for standing purposes
depends upon the provisions of the Ethics in Government Act and the
30. Id. at 1491.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, 454 U.S. 462, 472 (1982).
34. Dellums, 573 F. Supp. at 1494.
35. See Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
36. Dellums, 573 F. Supp. at 1494 n.l. The court also noted that the court's ability to
redress the harm alleged under this theory was absent. Id.
37. Id. at 1494.
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intent of Congress in enacting it.38 The court stated: "[t]hus, the critical question is whether the Ethics in Government Act confers any
procedural rights upon persons who have supplied the Attorney Gen39
eral with appropriate information.1
To determine whether the Ethics Act conferred such a procedural right, the court cited the district court decision in Nathan v.
Attorney General,40 which had previously addressed this issue. The
Nathan court found that under the Ethics Act neither the special division of the court responsible for the appointment of an independent
counsel nor Congress had jurisdiction to review the Attorney General's refusal to investigate. 4' Thus, the court said: "if the Act is enforceable at all it must be through those, like plaintiffs here, who have
supplied specific information and pursue their application for an in'42
vestigation in the District Court."
The Dellums court found that the Nathan conclusion was consistent with City of Davis v. Coleman,4 3 an analogous Ninth Circuit decision. City of Davis involved the National Environmental Protection
Act, 44 which requires federal agencies contemplating certain specified
actions to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS"). In
preparation of the EIS, the agency is required to allow local authorities the opportunity to present information and comments.4 5 After a
federal agency failed to prepare an EIS as required by law, the city of
Davis brought an action in federal court.46 The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that the deprivation of the plaintiffs' opportunity to
present information and comment on the EIS constituted an injury
sufficient to support standing to challenge the agency's decision. The
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1495. The court refuted the defendant's reliance on Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66
(1975), by citing a relevant passage from Legal Aid Society of Alameda Co. v. Brennan, 608
F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1979), which stated: "[t]he reluctance of courts to imply separate private
enforcement rights from statutes or regulations which provide explicitly for government enforcement procedures and penalties, [citing Cort v. Ash], is not applicable to such a private
proceeding as this." Dellums, 573 F. Supp. at 1495 n.3.
40. 557 F. Supp. 1186 (D.D.C. 1983).
41. Id. at 1189. The court stated: "Nor does Congress have any special enforcement
power; under the Act members of the Judiciary Committees of the House or Senate can only
request appointment of a Special Prosecutor, and, in any event, if an Attorney General ignores
his duty to investigate and report to Congress, Congress remains uninformed and cannot act."
Id.
42. Dellums, 573 F. Supp. at 1495.
43. 521 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1975).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1975).
45. Dellums, 573 F. Supp. at 1495.
46. Id.
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Dellums court stated that the court in City of Davis "found standing
without reference to any explicit language in the statute or its legislative history, i.e., simply by virtue of the statutory scheme which envisioned comments by local agencies. ' ' 47 The court concluded: "[i]n the
case at bar as in City of Davis... Congress conferred upon [the plain'' 8
tiffs] a right to a judicial determination. 1
In finding that Congress created a procedural right under the
Ethics Act as to individuals who supply the requisite information, the
court additionally found that the plaintiffs' claim fell within the "zone
of interests" protected by the statute. 49 However, according to the
court, this is not the end of the standing inquiry, because standing
also requires that the court have the authority to provide for redress
in the event of a favorable decision. 50 Thus, the court must be able to
compel the Attorney General to conduct a preliminary investigation.
The court stated: "[we] may grant this relief if (1) the decision not to
conduct a preliminary investigation is subject to judicial review and
(2) if the remedy of mandamus to the Attorney General is
5
permitted." '
To determine whether the court could review the Attorney General's decision not to conduct a preliminary investigation, the court
applied the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"). 52 The APA
was created by Congress to facilitate judicial review of administrative
actions 53 by incorporating a strong presumption of the right to judicial review, unless there is clear and convincing evidence that Congress intended otherwise.5 4 The APA authorizes judicial review of
agency actions, unless expressly precluded by statute or committed to
agency discretion.55 The court found that neither of the APA exceptions applied. The Ethics in Government Act is silent as to review of
the Attorney General's refusal to conduct a preliminary investigation,
and because the Attorney General's duty under the Ethics in Govern47.

Id.

48.

Id. at 1496.

49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 1497 n.7.
Id. at 1497.
Id. at 1497-98.
5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982) provides: "a person suffering legal wrong because of agency

action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof."
53. The Attorney General is an "agency" subject to review under the APA. See Proietti
v. Levi, 530 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1976).
54. Dellums, 573 F. Supp. at 1498.
55. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1),(2) (1982).
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. [it] is not the sort of

' '56
unlimited discretion precluding review under the APA.
According to the court, a mandamus order is appropriate
"[w]here federal officials have acted outside their statutory authority."' 57 The court found that the defendants had failed to perform
their statutory duty by refusing to conduct a preliminary investigation
mandated by the Ethics in Government Act which states that the
"Attorney General 'shall' conduct a preliminary investigation upon
the receipt of the information, not that he 'may' do so. '' 58 Further,
because the Attorney General's duty to conduct a preliminary investigation is essentially a ministerial task, the court stated: "mandamus is
traditionally a proper remedy."' 59 Finally, the court concluded that
plaintiffs had standing because their "claims as framed in this action
meet all of the requirements listed by the Supreme Court in Valley
Forge."6o

The court next addressed the issue of whether the case involved a
"nonjusticiable" political question. 61 After citing issues identified by
62
the Supreme Court as involving nonjusticiable political questions,
the court contrasted the present case with Crockett v. Reagan63 and
Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan,64 two cases in which federal courts had
declined on political question grounds to hear cases challenging exec56.
57.

Dellums, 573 F. Supp. at 1498-99.
Id. at 1500. See also Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682,

701-02 (1949).

58.

Dellums, 573 F. Supp. at 1499.

59.

Id. at 1500, citing Elliot v. Weinberger, 564 F.2d 1219, 1226 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd in

part on other grounds, 442 U.S. 682 (1979).
60. Dellums, 573 F. Supp. at 1501,
61. Id. Professor Gunther states, "[the] most confined, most clearly legitimate [strand of
the political question doctrine] is the 'constitutional commitment' strand. That variety of
political question reflects separation of powers principles and rests on the position that the
Constitution commits the final determination of some constitutional questions to agencies
other than courts." G. GUNTHER, CONSTrrTrUTIONAL LAW 1608 (1 1th ed. 1985).
62.

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). The Baker Court stated:

Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a
textually demonstrable consitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of
a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking

independent resolution without express lack of the respect due coordinate branches
of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Id
63.

558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982).

64.

568 F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1983).
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utive actions in Central America. In Crockett, members of Congress
sought a declaration that military aid supplied to the government of
El Salvador violated the War Powers Resolution. 65 The court held
that "the factfinding necessary to resolve the issue was beyond its
competence and rendered the case nonjusticiable." 6 6 In Sanchez-Espinoza, the plaintiffs67 sought a declaration that the President had violated the Neutrality Act and the War Powers Resolution 68 by
financing and supporting paramilitary activities designed to over-

throw the government of Nicaragua. 69 The court held: (1) no discoverable and manageable standards existed for resolving the dispute; (2)
the dispute could not be resolved without disagreeing with another
branch of government concerning the merits of the controversy; and
(3) there was "danger of embarrassment to the federal government
from multifarious pronouncements by different branches. '70
Although noting factual similarities with Crockett and SanchezEspinoza, the Dellums court found that similarity does not determine
the justiciability of an action. 7' In contrast to Crockett and SanchezEspinoza, the plaintiffs in Dellums did not challenge any presidential
action. Instead, they sought only to compel performance of the law. 72
The Dellums court stated that: "[s]uch relief is unquestionably within
judicial competence. '73 Additionally, once the court mandates the
preliminary investigation, "[aill subtleties of factfinding concerning
events in Latin America will be left with the political branches, which
are better equipped to perform those functions. '74
However, the defendants argued that the court could not inject
itself into foreign policy and that the applicability of the Neutrality
Act to presidential actions should be left to the "political branches" of
government to resolve v5 The court found: "[although] courts must
hesitate before entertaining questions of the President's authority in
the conduct of foreign relations

. . .

not every case involving foreign

65. 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (1973).
66. Crockett, 558 F. Supp. at 895.
67. The plaintiffs included the individuals who were plaintiffs in Dellums. Dellums v.
Smith, 573 F. Supp. 1489, 1501 (N.D.Cal. 1983).
68. 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (1973).
69. Dellums, 573 F. Supp. at 1501.
70. Id.
71.
72.

Id. at 1502.
Id.

73.

Id.

74.
75.

Id.
Id. at 1501.
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relations lies beyond judicial cognizance. ' 76 The court concluded
that the issue presented was well suited for judicial resolution which
would not require interference with the Executive's conduct of foreign
policy. Hence, the political question doctrine did not prevent
jurisdiction.

77

The court next dealt with whether the case called for an impermissible "advisory opinion. ' '7 8 The defendants claimed that a determination as to the applicability of the Neutrality Act to presidential
actions was an advisory opinion. Nevertheless, the court only briefly
discussed this issue and concluded that the defendants' contention
was without merit.79 The court stated: "[t]o the extent such a question is raised by this case it is presented in an adversary context, and
in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process."80
Finally, while noting that no material facts were in dispute,81 the
court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint and
granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment8 2 The court immediately granted the plaintiffs' request for an order requiring the Attorney General to conduct the preliminary investigation.8 3
76. Id. at 1502.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1503. Since 1793, when the Supreme Court declined to issue an advisory opinion requested by President Washington regarding America's neutrality toward the war between England and France, the Supreme Court has forbidden the federal courts from issuing
legal advice in an attempt to secure the integrity of the judicial system. See G. GUNTHER,
supra note 61, at 1535.
79. Dellums, 573 F. Supp. at 1503.
80. Id.
81. Id. The court noted:
No material facts are in dispute. Defendants agreed that:
1. Exhibits A and B to plaintiffs' statement of material facts are the documents received from plaintiffs in connection with their request for institution of a preliminary
investigation pursuant to the Ethics in Government Act; 2. Exhibit C to plaintiffs'
statement of material facts in the letter of March 18, 1983 to plaintiff Ronald V.
Dellums from D. Lowell Jensen, Assistant Attorney General, denying plaintiffs' request; 3. No preliminary investigation was undertaken and no recommendation for
appointment of an independent counsel was submitted; 4. Paragraph 3 of plaintiffs'
statement of material facts contains an accurate reproduction of allegations received
from plaintiffs in connection with their request to the Attorney General under the
Ethics in Government Act.
Id.
82. Id. at 1505.
83. Id. The court ordered the Attorney General to conduct a preliminary investigation
into the conduct of any persons covered by the Ethics Act named in the information submitted
by the plaintiffs relating to violations of the Neutrality Act arising out of actions connected to
paramilitary expeditions against Nicaragua. In addition, if the Attorney General failed to conduct such an investigation within ninety days of the date of the order, he would be compelled
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The defendants then filed a motion to alter judgment.8 4 In support of their motion, the defendants claimed that the Neutrality Act
did not apply to any action authorized by the President and that a
preliminary investigation was not required because the Justice Department had established a policy not to prosecute Executive officials
for violations of the Neutrality Act.8 5 As to the first argument, the
court found that the relevant consideration was whether the Act includes the activities alleged by plaintiffs. 8 6 After a lengthy analysis of
the Neutrality Act's history and application, the court held that the
Neutrality Act reasonably included the activities alleged by plaintiffs. 8 7 Similarly, the court was not swayed by the defendants' second
argument. The court found that under the Ethics in Government
Act, a Justice Department policy of non-prosecution may be taken
into account only when making a determination whether to apply for
independent counsel, not when deciding whether to conduct a prelim88
inary investigation.
In denying the defendants' motion to alter judgment, the court
stated: "[i]f the extensive information plaintiffs have laid before the
Attorney General should turn out 'upon proper investigation' to show
violations of the Neutrality Act, there is danger that, unless the violations be terminated, the nation may be involved in a war not declared
by Congress."8' 9
In the alternative, the defendants moved for stay of judgment
pending appeal. 90 In evaluating the defendants' motion to stay, the
court applied the three-part test established in Warm Springs Dam
Task Force v. Gribble:9 1 (1) Did the moving party establish a strong
likelihood of success on the merits; (2) Does the balance of irreparable
harm favor the moving party; and (3) Is the public interest served by
the grant of the injunction. Finding the motion to stay was merely a
to apply for the appointment of an independent counsel as provided in 28 U.S.C. § 592(c)(1)

(1982). Id.
84. Dellums v. Smith, 577 F. Supp. 1449 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
85. Id. at 1451.
86. Id. at 1452.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1455. The court noted that consideration of an established policy of non-prosecution was permitted to ensure that Government officials would not be targeted in an investigation where private citizens would escape prosecution. Id.
89. Id. at 1456.
90. Dellums v. Smith, 577 F. Supp. 1456 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
91. 565 F.2d 549, 551 (9th Cir. 1977).
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repetition of contentions decided adversely to them 92 the court established that it was not likely the defendants would be successful on
appeal. 93 The court also rejected the defendants' claim that irreparable harm would result because the case could become moot if they
proceeded with an investigation, forcing them to utilize scarce investigatory resources. 94 The court found mootness was not a proper consideration in a stay motion, and the limited use of resources for a
preliminary investigation was not a concern where the court simply
ordered compliance with a statute. 95 Finally, the court noted that the
Attorney General's failure to act damaged the public interest which
would be further compromised by granting a stay. 96 The court ac97
cordingly denied the defendants' motion to stay pending appeal.

B.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

On appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Betty B.
Fletcher, writing for an unanimous court, 9 held that although the
Ethics in Government Act imposed an affirmative duty upon the Attorney General to conduct a preliminary investigation, these plaintiffs
lacked standing to complain that the Attorney General failed to discharge that duty. 99 Hence, the plaintiffs could not seek a mandamus
order to compel the Attorney General to conduct the preliminary investigation. Accordingly, the court refused to reach the issue of the
Neutrality Act's applicability to executive actions. 1°°
The court began its review of the district court's decision by citing Nathan v. Smith 10 1 and Banzhaf v. Smith, 0 2 in which the District
of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals declined, on two occasions, to
92.
93.
94.
95.

Dellums, 577 F. Supp. at 1457.
Id. at 1458.
Id.
Id.

96.

Id. at 1459.

97.

Id.

98. The case was heard before a three judge panel consisting of Hon. Thomas E.
Fairchild, Hon. William Cameron Canby Jr., and Hon. Betty B. Fletcher.
99. Dellum v. Smith, 797 F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1986).

100. Id. at 820.
101. Nathan v. Attorney General of the United States, 557 F. Supp. 1186 (D.D.C. 1983),
ordergranted, 563 F. Supp. 815 (D.D.C. 1983), rev'd sub nomL Nathan v. Smith, 737 F.2d 1069
(D.C. Cir. 1984). Nathan was brought on behalf of individuals killed or wounded at a 1979
Greensboro, North Carolina parade sponsored by the Communist Workers' Party. During the
parade, members of the Ku Klux Klan and American Nazi Party made an armed assault upon

the marchers resulting in death and injury. The plaintiffs claimed that certain Executive officials authorized or negligently permitted the attack and conspired to conceal their involvement. Although the district court found for the plaintiffs, Nathan, 557 F. Supp. at 1190, the
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review the Attorney General's refusal to conduct a preliminary investigation under the Ethics in Government Act.'0 3 The court then
noted that, although the Attorney General was under a mandatory
duty to conduct an investigation, the court's inquiry was a narrow
one. The court stated, "we must decide whether the Attorney General's statutory duty to conduct a preliminary investigation may be
°4
enforced by this court at the behest of these particular plaintiffs.'
The court noted that although members of the public generally
do not have standing to complain when the government violates the
law, Congress may create procedural rights, which if violated constitute injury-in-fact sufficient to satisfy the standing requirement. 0 5
The district court bypassed entirely the injury-in-fact inquiry when it
reasoned that Congress' imposition of a mandatory duty to conduct a
preliminary investigation created a correlative procedural right to
10 7
have the allegations investigated.1 06 In citing Alvarez v. Longboy,
the court stated that procedural rights must be premised on evidence
in the statutory language, purpose, or legislative history that Congress
08
intended to create such a right.'
After finding that the district court failed to make an inquiry into
the Ethics in Government Act's language, purpose, and legislative
history, the circuit court proceeded with its own inquiry. It began by
noting that the language of the Act is silent as to procedural rights
vested in members of the public.' ° 9 The court reasoned that rather
than establishing procedural rights in the public, Congress provided
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in an order containing no rationale.
Nathan, 737 F.2d at 1070. Circuit Judges Davis and Bork filed separate concurring opinions.
102. Banzhaf v. Smith, 588 F. Supp. 1489 (D.D.C. 1984),judgment entered, 588 F. Supp.
1498 (D.D.C. 1984), vacatedpercuriam, 737 F.2d 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In Banzhaf, private
citizens brought an action to compel appointment of independent counsel to investigate alleged
violations of criminal law (including, inter alia, interference with nomination or election of a
candidate for the office of President (18 U.S.C. § 595 (1982)) and theft of records of the United
States (18 U.S.C. §§ 641, 654, 661 (1982))) in the transmittal of campaign briefing materials
from the Carter White House to the Reagan presidential campaign. Although the district
court found it had the authority to enforce the congressionally created statutory duty under
the Ethics Act, Banzhaf, 588 F. Supp. at 1494, the en banc District of Columbia Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed, finding instead that the court could not review the Attorney General's
refusal to conduct a preliminary investigation. Banzhaf, 737 F.2d at 1167-68.
103. Dellums, 797 F.2d at 818-19.
104. Id. at 821.
105. Id. (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984)).
106. Dellums, 797 F.2d at 821.
107. 697 F.2d 1333 (9th Cir. 1983).
108. Dellums, 797 F.2d at 821.
109. Id.
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for congressional review through the Judiciary Committees of both
houses of Congress.1 10 Further, the court noted that the Act neither
compels notice of a preliminary investigation nor compels notice
when the Attorney General seeks appointment of independent counsel to those who provide the information."'
The court then turned to the purpose and legislative history of
the Act.11 2 The court began by noting the plaintiffs' contention that it
would eviscerate the Act if the Attorney General could simply refuse
to comply with its provisions.1 1 3 In particular, the plaintiffs pointed
out that Congress intended to prevent the Attorney General from circumventing the Act." 4 The court stated, "[p]laintiffs have failed to
persuade us, however, that the Ethics Act will be wholly unenforceable unless we ascribe to Congress the purpose to confer procedural
rights on private citizens."' 1 5
Finally, the court noted that although the Supreme Court found
a strong presumption favoring reviewability under the Administrative
Procedures Act, "[t]he presumption may be overcome by specific language or specific legislative history, reliably indicating intent to preclude review, or by inferences of intent drawn from the statutory
scheme as a whole."16 The court argued that the Ethics in Government Act precluded review at the behest of the public by granting
congressional oversight through the Judiciary Committees." 7 In concluding the court stated, "[w]e are persuaded that Congress did not
intend thereby to establish procedural rights in the public. Rather it
envisioned that enforcement by members of congressional judiciary
committees would be effective in preventing the Attorney General
from refusing to obey the law.""" The court then reversed the district court's ruling and dismissed the case."19
110. Id. at 822. 28 U.S.C. § 595(e) (1982) provides: "[a] majority of majority party members or a majority of all nonmajority party members of the Committee on the Judiciary of
either House of Congress may request in writing that the Attorney General apply for the

appointment of a[n] independent counsel."
111.

Dellums, 797 F.2d at 822.

112. Id.
113. Id.
114.

Id.

115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 823.
118.
119.

Id.
Id.

1989]

Dellums v. Smith
III.
A.

243

ANALYSIS

The Ethics in Government Act

The 1978 Ethics in Government Act was created in the wake of
Watergate 120 and other episodes of criminal wrongdoing committed
by high level Executive branch officials. 12 1 The Act was passed by
Congress to eliminate actual or perceived conflicts on interest involving Department of Justice prosecutions of Executive branch officials. 122 Any lingering doubts as to the Ethics in Government Act's
constitutionality has been put to rest by the recent Supreme Court
23
decision in Morrison v. Olson. 1
Both the Dellums district court 124 and circuit court, 12 5 agreed
that the Attorney General was required to conduct a preliminary investigation when he received specific and credible information 126 per127
taining to criminal wrongdoing within the Executive branch.
However, the courts differed on the question as to whether the Ethics
120. A recent Senate Report on the Ethics Act stated:
A primary impetus for the independent counsel statute was the 1973 order by President Nixon to the Department of Justice to fire Archibald Cox, a "special prosecutor" who had been appointed by the President from outside the government to
investigate the criminal allegations known as Watergate involving such officials as
the President's Chief of Staff and Attorney General.
The order to fire Mr. Cox apparently arose from his refusal to obey earlier Presidential directives that he halt his efforts to obtain tape recordings and other records
in the President's possession. Elliot Richardson, then Attorney General, and William Ruckelshaus, then Deputy Attorney General, resigned rather than fire Mr. Cox;
Robert Bork, then Solicitor General, issued the desired order. The abrupt departure
of Messrs. Cox, Richardson, and Ruckelshaus from the Department of Justice was
later described by the press as the "Saturday Night Massacre."
INDEPENDENT COUNSEL REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1987, S.REP. No. 123, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. 3 (1987).
121. President Jimmy Carter expressed the need for such an Act in a speech to Congress
in May of 1977. SPEECH BY PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER, I PUn. PAPERS 786 (May 3, 1977).

122. See

SPECIAL PROSECUTOR ACT OF

1978:

REPORT FROM THE COMMITTEE ON THE

JUDICIARY, H.REP. No. 1307, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. at 252 (1978).
123. Morrison v. Olson, 108 S.Ct. 2597 (1988), Scalia J. dissenting. In a lopsided 7-1
decision, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, held that the Ethics in Government
Act's independent counsel provision is constitutional and does not impermissibly infringe upon
the separation of powers. However, the Court did not address the question presented in this
note.
124. Dellums v. Smith, 573 F. Supp. 1489, 1505 (N.D.Cal. 1983).
125. Dellums v. Smith, 797 F.2d 817, 819 (9th Cir. 1986).
126. For the purposes of this analysis, we will assume that the information provided by the
plaintiffs was sufficiently credible and specific within the meaning of the Ethics in Government
Act to trigger a preliminary investigation.
127. 18 U.S.C. § 592(a)(2) (1986) states: "In conducting preliminary investigations pursuant to this section, the Attorney General shall have no authority to convene grand juries, plea
bargain, grant immunity, or issue subpenas."
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in Government Act conferred procedural rights upon private citizens
to compel an investigation when the Attorney General fails to carry
1 28
out his duty under the Act.
Although both the district court and circuit court claimed to apply the same standards to the question of standing under the Ethics in
Government Act, the actual application of the law and conclusions
were strikingly different. To infer standing upon the plaintiffs, the
district court primarily relied upon the underlying purpose of the Eth30
ics Act,1 29 the application of the Administrative Procedures Act,1
and cases interpreting other Acts in which Congress failed to provide
for judicial review.' 3' In contrast, the circuit court relied upon an
analysis of the Ethics Act's language, purpose and legislative history
32
to conclude that the plaintiffs could not seek judicial review.
Although the circuit court is correct that Congress did not expressly provide for judicial review under the Ethics Act, this fact
alone should not be read as an intent to preclude review. In Sierra
Club v. Peterson, 3 3 the Ninth Circuit specifically stated that Congress' failure to adopt a provision providing for review at the behest of
private citizens "is not an indication of congressional intent to prohibit such suits.' 34 In fact, as it did in another provision of the
Act, 3 5 Congress was perfectly capable of providing language which
would have specifically prohibited judicial review, but it chose instead
not to do so. Indeed, in County ofAlameda v. Weinberger136 the court
held that, "[review] shall not be deemed foreclosed unless Congress
137
has forbidden review in unmistakable terms."'
The Dellums circuit court found that intent to preclude judicial
review could be discerned from § 595(e) of the Ethics Act, which
128. Although a preliminary investigation is mandated under the Ethics Act, once the
investigation is completed, the Attorney General may choose not to apply for an independent
counsel if he concludes there are no reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation or
prosecution is warranted. See 28 U.S.C. § 592(a)(1) (1982).
129. Dellums v. Smith, 573 F. Supp. 1489, 1493 (N.D.Cal. 1983).
130. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1982).
131. See City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1975); Nathan v. Attorney
General, 557 F. Supp. at 1186 (D.D.C. 1983).
132. Dellums v. Smith, 797 F.2d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 1986).
133. 705 F.2d 1475 (9th Cir. 1983).
134. Id. at 1479 (emphasis added).
135. Under the Ethics Act, the Attorney General's decision to apply for independent
counsel after completion of the preliminary investigation is specifically not reviewable by the
federal courts. 28 U.S.C. § 592(f) (1982).
136. 520 F.2d 344 (9th Cir. 1975).

137. Id. at 348.
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grants oversight to the Judiciary Committees of Congress. The court
stated, "[c]entral to our analysis is the Ethics Act's provision for oversight of the Attorney General's compliance with the Ethics Act by
members of the congressional judiciary committees, not the publie."' 138 However, the provision of the Ethics Act which grants congressional oversight does not provide any enforcement mechanism.
Under the Act, Congress cannot require the Attorney General to conduct a preliminary investigation nor require the Attorney General to
request appointment of an independent counsel. 139 Indeed, the weakness of the congressional oversight provision was demonstrated in the
midst of the Dellums litigation when the Attorney General rejected a
request by the majority of the Democratic members of the House Judiciary Committee to conduct a preliminary investigation into Dellums' allegations. 140
In response to the plaintiffs' argument that congressional oversight is not a meaningful remedy in that Congress will seldom invoke
its provisions, the Court of Appeals found, "[tjhe anticipated infrequency of such a request does not make the oversight authority meaningless. The Attorney General's flouting of the law he is sworn to
uphold is not, in the normal course of things, the sort of event that we
would anticipate required frequent correction."' 14 1 Nevertheless, Congress reached a far different conclusion. The Senate report on the
Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1987 concluded that between 1982 and 1987, the Justice Department processed thirty-six
cases under the Ethics Act. 142 Of these original thirty-six, the Justice
Department reportedly closed twenty-five prior to conducting the preliminary investigation specified in the law.143 The Justice Department
claimed that fifteen of the cases were closed because (1) the information provided allegedly involved a federal official not covered by the
Act or (2) the information lacked specificity or credibility. 144 How138.

Dellums v. Smith, 797 F.2d 817, 823 (9th Cir. 1986).

139. In Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988), the Supreme Court pointed out that
"the [Ethics] Act does empower certain members of Congress to request the Attorney General
to apply for the appointment of an independent counsel, but the Attorney General has no duty
to comply with the request, although he must respond within a certain time limit." Id. at
2620-21.
140. See Brief for the Appellees at Addendum B, Dellums v. Smith, 797 F.2d 817 (9th Cir.
1986) (No. 84-1525).
141. Dellums, 797 F.2d at 823 n.4.
142. INDEPENDENT COUNSEL REAUTHORIZATION AcT OF 1987, S. REP. No. 123, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1987).
143. Id.
144. Id.
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ever, of the remaining ten cases, the Justice Department claimed that
the evidence did not establish a crime, or there was insufficient evidence of a subjects criminal intent and therefore no crime to investigate. 145 The Senate report concluded: "[t]hus, contrary to the
statutory standard, in 50% of the cases handled by the Justice Department since 1982 in which it declined to conduct a preliminary
investigation of a covered official, it relied on factors other than credibility and specificity to evaluate the case."' 146
The circuit court in Dellums noted that during the 1981 hearings
on the reauthorization of the Ethics in Government Act, the Justice
Department sought repeal of the Act, or alternatively, an amendment
vesting sole discretion in the Attorney General to appoint or remove
148
the independent counsel. 147 Congress rejected these proposals,
knowing that such an amendment would defeat the purpose of the
Act-to establish a procedure for resolving the conflict of interest
which inevitably results when the Attorney General is called upon to
14 9
pursue allegations of wrongdoing against close political associates.
Although the Attorney General was unsuccessful in persuading Congress to vest in him the power to appoint the independent counsel, the
decision in Dellums does exactly that. The decision grants sole discretion to the Attorney General by eliminating judicial review, the only
effective enforcement mechanism.150
152
5
Following the circuit court decisions in Nathan,1 ' Banzhaf,
and Dellums,15 3 it is highly unlikely that a federal court would permit
145.

Id.

146. Id.
147. Dellums v. Smith, 797 F.2d 817, 820 (9th Cir. 1986).
148. Id. Congress did, however, amend the Ethics Act to (1) limit the range of individuals
subject to investigation; (2) permit the Attorney General to consider the credibility of the

source of the information provided before undertaking a preliminary investigation; (3) raise the
standard for appointment of a special prosecutor from one requiring appointment unless the
allegations were wholly unsubstantiated to one requiring appointment unless there were no
reasonable grounds to believe further investigation was warranted; and (4) change the name
"special prosecutor" to "independent counsel". Id. at 820-21.
149. See ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1982: HEARINGS ON S. 2059
BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, S.REP. No. 2059, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-7

(1981).
150. The only remaining incentive for the Attorney General to comply with the Ethics Act
is the threat of congressional impeachment. However, it is highly doubtful that Congress
would ever have the will to impeach an Attorney General for failing to comply with the Act.
151. Nathan v. Smith, 737 F.2d 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
152. Banzhaf v. Smith, 737 F.2d 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
153. Dellums v. Smith, 797 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1986).
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a private citizen to challenge the Attorney General's refusal to con-

duct a preliminary investigation in compliance with the Ethics Act. 154
However, Congress has the authority to remedy this unfortunate situation by amending the Ethics Act to expressly provide for judicial
review of the Attorney General's failure to conduct a preliminary
investigation. 155
Although there are several ways to codify judicial review under
the Ethics Act, 156 the most feasible approach was established by the
Dellums district court.' 57 Under this formulation, the scope of the
review would be a narrow one. The designated court would simply
determine whether the Attorney General had fulfilled his duty to conduct a preliminary investigation. If it found that the Attorney General had failed to fulfill that duty, the court would order the Attorney
General to investigate or appoint an independent counsel. Such an
approach would "ensure that no one, however high or important a
position he holds in the executive branch, is insulated from the investigation called for by the provisions of the Ethics in Government
58
Act."1
B.

The Neutrality Act

Because the Dellums circuit court held that the plaintiffs lacked
standing to seek review, it did not reached the question of the Neutrality Act's applicability to executive actions. 59 However, the district court, which noted that the plaintiffs were not required to show
154. The Supreme Court has never granted review of an Attorney General's failure to
comply with the provisions of the Ethics Act. Following Dellums, the district court in
Beauchamp v. Meese, 657 F. Supp. 1263 (N.D.IlI. 1987), stated: "[i]t is unnecessary to decide
whether Beauchamp provided the Attorney General with credible and specific information
about wrongdoing . . . or whether § 592(a)(1) requires the Attorney General to investigate
credible and specific allegations of criminal wrongdoing, because no private right of action
exists to enforce such a requirement." Beauchamp, 657 F. Supp. at 1264 (footnote omitted).
155. A recent commentator stated, "[a] helpful analogy can be drawn to statutes that allow private litigants in the antitrust field to bring actions for treble damages. Such legislation
has proved to be extremely effective, leading some to believe that the... procedure could be
utilized successfully in the independent counsel area as well." Comment, The Ethics in Government Act of 1978."Problems with the Attorney General's Discretionand Proposalsfor Reform,
1985 DUKE L.J. 497, 512.

156. For a thorough analysis of other proposals to prevent the Attorney General from
"short-circuiting the independent counsel mechanism" see Comment, supra note 155.
157. Dellums v. Smith, 573 F. Supp. 1489 (N.D.Cal. 1983).
158. Id. at 1493.
159. The Dellums circuit court stated: "[because we find that the district court erred in
exercising jurisdiction over this suit, we do not reach the merits of the court's ruling on the
Neutrality Act." Dellums v. Smith, 797 F.2d 817, 820 (9th Cir. 1986).

Loy. L.A. Intl & Comp. LJ.

[Vol. 11:229

that "all legal elements of [the] crime exist[ed]" in order to trigger an
investigation, 160 held that the Attorney General was compelled to
conduct an investigation if "the view [was] reasonable that the Neutrality Act proscribes the activities alleged by plaintiffs." 16 1 Had the
circuit court reached the question of the Neutrality Act's applicability, it could have reasonably concluded that the Neutrality Act applied to Executive officials who participate in actions against nations
with whom the United States is at peace.
The Attorney General, in his appellate brief, argued that the
Neutrality Act does not reach the conduct of government officials acting pursuant to official government policy. 162 He claimed that the
Act "proscribes individual conduct, not government activities."' 63
This argument fails under close scrutiny. A review of the Neutrality
Act's language, purpose and history reveals that Congress intended
the Act to apply to Executive officials.
The language of the Neutrality Act does not exclude any government officials from its reach.164 In contrast, the contemporaneous Logan Act, 165 which prohibits private communications with foreign
governments, expressly excludes actions taken with government approval. 166 Thus, the Logan Act indicates congressional familiarity
with such an exception and its intent not to include an exception for
executive action within the Neutrality Act. 67 Secondly, as noted by
160. Dellums v. Smith, 577 F. Supp. 1449, 1550 (N.D.Cal. 1984).
161. Id. at 1551 (emphasis added).
162. Brief of the Appellants at 31, Dellums v. Smith, 797 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1986) (No. 841525). The defendants stated: "[b]ased upon reasonable legal judgment and the overwhelming
evidence of congressional intent, the Attorney General has concluded that plaintiffs' allegations, even if true, simply do not constitute a federal crime-namely, that [the Neutrality Act]
does not proscribe acts taken in pursuit of official governmental policy." Id.
163. Id. at 32. Cf United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600 (1941); Wilson v. Omaha
Indian Tribes, 442 U.S. 653 (1979); FPC v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99 (1960);
United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
164. The Neutrality Act states:
Whoever, within the United States, knowingly begins or sets on foot or provides or
prepares a means for or furnishes the money for, or takes part in, any military or
naval expedition or enterprise to be carried on from thence against the territory or
dominion of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district, or people with
whom the United States is at peace, shall be fined not more than $3,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 960 (1982).
165. 18 U.S.C. § 953 (1982).
166. 18 U.S.C. § 953 (1982) states in part: "Any citizen of the United States, wherever he
may be, who, without authority of the United States ....
Id.
167. See 18 U.S.C. § 951 (1982) which states in pertinent part: "[wihoever other than a
diplomatic or consular officer or attache... " Id.
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plaintiffs, although the original drafters of the Neutrality Act copied
prior English law, "Congress specifically deleted the provision in the
English law which provided that such activity was a crime only when
done 'without leave or license of his Majesty.' 168 Thus, Congress
impliedly intended the Act to apply to any person under the jurisdiction of the United States, including government officials.
The Attorney General argued that "Congress sought not to restrict executive prerogatives under Article II [of the Constitution], but
to support the Executive by criminalizing acts of individuals that
threatened to interfere with the government's conduct of foreign policy."1 69 A review of the Neutrality Act's purpose results in a contrary
conclusion. 70 Congress passed the Neutrality Act following President Washington's "Executive Neutrality Proclamation" issued in
April of 1793.' 7 1 Although the immediate explanation for the adoption of the Neutrality Act involved the growing fear that the United
States might become entangled in the french revolution, 72 a more
thorough analysis reveals that Congress approved the Act to prevent
"unchecked hostile expeditions [which] would have amounted to private usurpation of the public power, vested in Congress, to declare
war and issue letters of marque and reprisal.' 73 Indeed, far from
168. Brief for the Appellees at 29, Dellums v. Smith, 797 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1986) (No. 841525). The plaintiffs stated, "It is clear that the reason for this deletion rested in the American
Constitutional framework, which, unlike the English, gave to the Legislature and not the Executive-the power of raising armies, issuing letters of marque and reprisal and declaring war."
Id. at 29 n.27.
169. Brief for the Appellants at 35, Dellums v. Smith, 797 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1986) (No.
84-1525). The Attorney General concluded, "[flar from circumscribing executive authority,
the Neutrality Act was proposed by the Executive to strengthen the executive." Id at 36.
170. Although Congress did intend to strengthen the sovereign's power through the Neutrality Act, the Attorney General's analysis is fatally flawed in that he equates the President
with the sovereign. The plaintiffs state, "[b]ut the drafters of the Constitution and Neutrality
Act all understood that the sovereign authority to declare war and initiate inferior hostilities
was not a presidential prerogative but a congressional one." Brief for the Appellees at 32,
Dellums v. Smith, 797 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1986) (No. 84-1525).
171. Comment, Non-enforcement of the NeutralityAct: InternationalLaw and Foreign Policy Powers Under the Constitution, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1955, 1961 (1982).
172. Lobel, The Rise and Decline of the NeutralityAct: Sovereignty and CongressionalWar
Powers in United States Foreign Policy, 24 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 11 (1983).
173. Comment, Non-enforcement of the NeutralityAct: InternationalLaw and Foreign Policy Powers Under the Constitution, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1955, 1965 (1982). Secretary of State
Thomas Jefferson stated:
If one citizen has a right to go to war of his own authority, every citizen has the
same. If every citizen has that right, then the nation (which is composed of all its
citizens) has a right to go to war, by the authority of its individual citizens. But this
is not true either on the general principles of society, or by our Constitution, which
gives that power to Congress alone and not citizens individually.
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strengthening executive authority, as contended by the Attorney General, the Neutrality Act "restricts executive discretion to overlook violations of international law and guards Congress' own role in foreign
74
affairs." 1
The history of the Neutrality Act confirms that the Act applies
to executive actions. Prior to Dellums, no President had ever asserted
that the Neutrality Act did not apply to Executive officials. 17 5 Similarly, congressional amendments to the Neutrality Act, offered by
Senator Slidell in 1854 and 1858 to allow the President to suspend the
Act's operation at his discretion, confirms that Congress also believed
that Executive officials were bound by the Act.176 The Slidell proposals, which were intended to allow private expeditions against the
Spanish colonial government in Cuba, failed to gain the necessary
votes and died.177 The Dellums district court noted, "[t]he failure of
Senator Slidell's proposed amendments fortifies the view that the
Neutrality Act grants no executive discretion to authorize paramilitary expeditions against foreign governments with which this nation is
78
not at war."''
The first prosecution under the newly enacted Neutrality Act
was the so-called Smith and Ogden trial in 1806.179 Colonel William
S. Smith and Samuel Ogden were tried in federal court for their involvement in a plot to attack Spanish forts in South America in the
hopes of triggering a widespread revolt against Spanish rule. 80 In
their defense, Smith and Ogden claimed that their actions had been
Brief for the Appellees at 30, Dellums v. Smith, 797 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1986) (No. 84-1525).
174. Comment, Non-enforcement of the Neutrality Act: InternationalLaw and Foreign Policy Powers Under the Constitution, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1955, 1964 (1982).
175. Brief for the Appellees at 37, Dellums v. Smith, 797 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1986) (No. 84-

1525).
176.

Dellums v. Smith, 577 F. Supp. 1449, 1453 (N.D.Cal. 1984). Under the proposed

amendments, suspension of the Neutrality Act could only be made during congressional recesses. Id.

177. Id.
178. Id. Similarly, a recent commentator stated: "[t]hat the waiver was considered necessary demonstrates that the executive never enjoyed such powers of abrogation in the first

place." Comment, The Iran-ContraAffair, the Neutrality Act, and the Statutory Definition of
"At Peace", 27 VA. J. INT'L L. 343, 352 (1987).
179. United States v. Smith and Ogden, 27 F. Cas. 1186, 1192 (C.C.D. N.Y. 1806) (Nos.
16341a, 16342, 16342a, 16342b).
180. See Reinstein, An Early View of Executive Powers And Privilege: The Trial of Smith
and Ogden, 2 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 309 (1975). Smith and Ogden were persuaded by Fran-

cisco de Miranda, a native of Venezuela, to participate in the expedition which was later defeated when Miranda's ship was intercepted by the Spaniards. Id. at 312.
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authorized by President Jefferson and his cabinet.' 8 ' The trial court,
presided over by Supreme Court Justice William Paterson, 82 held
that neither the Neutrality Act nor the Constitution creates any exceptions for the President or his Cabinet. 83 Justice Paterson stated
that, "[t]he President of the United States cannot control the [Neutrality] statute, nor dispense with its execution, and still less can he
authorize a person to do what the law forbids. If he could, it would
render the execution of the laws dependent on his will and
pleasure."1

84

The Attorney General attempted to prevent the application of
the Neutrality Act to executive actions by citing prior presidential
participation in military actions without the formal consent of Congress.1 85 Were these actions in violation of the Neutrality Act? The
Dellums district court drew a distinction between actions involving
regular United States troops and those involving private forces. 186 Indeed, one commentator has stated, "the legislative history of the
[Neutrality] statute indicates that its purpose was to prevent expeditions of private persons whether or not authorized by the Executive,
187
and not [to prevent] the use of regular United States forces."'
For most of its history, violations of the Neutrality Act have
been vigorously prosecuted by the government.18 8 In fact, not only
have previous Administrations rigorously enforced the Act, but all
prior Presidents have considered themselves bound by its restrictions.
Further, the language, purpose, and history of the Neutrality Act in181. To substantiate their claims, the defendants sought to compel the testimony of Secretary of State Madison and his subordinates. The court rejected the request ruling that any
possible testimony by Madison or the other named officials would be irrelevant to any possible
defense. Comment, The Iran-ContraAffair, the NeutralityAct, and the Statutory Definition of
"At Peace", 27 VA. J. INT'L L. 343, 354 (1987).
182. Justice Paterson was also a participant at the constitutional convention. Brief for the
Appellees at 34, Dellums v. Smith, 797 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1986) (No. 84-1525).
183. Id.
184. Lobel, The Rise and Decline of the NeutralityAct: Sovereignty and Congressional War
Powers in United States Foreign Policy, 24 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 1, 36 (1983). Similarly, Justice
Paterson found that the Constitution "which measures out the powers and defines the duties of
the President, does not vest in him any authority to set on foot a military expedition against a
nation with which the United States is at peace." Brief for the Appellees at 34, Deflums v.
Smith, 797 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1986) (No. 84-1525).
185. Brief for the Appellants at 38-39, Dellums v. Smith, 797 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1986)
(No. 84-1525).
186. Dellums v. Smith, 577 F. Supp. 1449, 1453 (N.D.Cal. 1984).
187. Lobel, supra note 184, at 31 n.159.
188. Between the years 1795 and 1925 there were thirty-four reported prosecutions for
violations of the Neutrality Act, one every four years. Lobel, supra note 184, at 43.
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dicates that the Act applies to Executive officials who participate in
paramilitary actions against foreign nations. Executive officials who
participate in paramilitary actions should not be exempt from the
Neutrality Act's reach merely because the Attorney General, the na189
tion's chief law enforcement officer, has chosen to ignore the law.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The plaintiffs in Dellums v. Smith attempted to force an investigation into the actions of an Administration bent on conducting a
covert war in Central America without the express consent of Congress. The plaintiffs were ultimately unsuccessful because the circuit
court found that the Ethics in Government Act does not contain a
private right of action to enforce compliance with the law. This note
has argued for a congressional amendment to the Ethics Act which
would authorize judicial review. Furthermore, this note has addressed the applicability of the Neutrality Act to Executive officials
and has argued that such an application is consistent with the language, history and purpose of the Act.
Congress enacted the Ethics in Government Act to prevent conflicts of interest which result when the Attorney General is called
upon to investigate criminal activity within the Executive branch.
Similarly, Congress enacted the Neutrality Act to place restrictions
upon executive discretion in the enforcement of international law and
to guard against usurpation of Congress' war powers. Although separated by nearly 200 years of lawmaking, both the Ethics in Government Act and the Neutrality Act involve congressional attempts to
place limits upon executive power and to remedy subtle flaws in the
Constitutional framework. Unfortunately, the noble objectives of
these Acts have not been fully realized.
Daniel L. Germain
189. Alexander Hamilton stated:
Government is frequently and aptly classed under two descriptions-a government
of force, and a government of laws; the first is the definition of despotism-the last, of
liberty. But how can a government of laws exist when the laws are disrespected and
disobeyed? Government supposes control. It is that power by which individuals in
society are kept from doing injury to each other, and are brought to co-operate to a
common end. The instruments by which it must act are either the authority of the
laws or force. If the first be destroyed, the last must be substituted; and where this
becomes the ordinary instrument of government, there is an end to liberty.
A. MASON, FREE GOVERNMENT IN THE MAKING 353 (11th printing, 1981).

